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We estimate a new-Keynesian DSGE model with the cost channel to assess its 
ability to replicate the price puzzle ie the inflationary impact of a monetary policy 
shock typically arising in VAR analysis. In order to correctly identify the 
monetary policy shock, we distinguish between a standard policy rate shifter and a 
shock to trend inflation ie the time-varying inflation target set by the Fed. While 
offering some statistical support to the cost channel, our estimated model clearly 
implies a negative inflation reaction to a tightening of monetary policy. We offer a 
discussion of the possible sources of mismatch between the VAR evidence and 
our own. 
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Selittääkö yritysten rahoituskustannusten vaihtelu 
rahapolitiikan epätavalliset hintavaikutukset? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 20/2009 
Efrem Castelnuovo 




Tässä tutkimuksessa estimoidaan uuskeynesiläinen rahapolitiikan makromalli, 
jossa ns. kustannuskanava eli yritysten rahoituskustannusten vaihtelu on keskei-
nen rahapolitiikan vaikutusten kannalta. Estimoidun mallin kykyä selittää ns. 
hintapähkinä eli rahapolitiikan kiristymisen inflatorisia vaikutuksia arvioidaan 
estimointitulosten perusteella. Hintapähkinä on tavanomainen tulos, kun rahapoli-
tiikan yllättävien muutosten, sokkien, vaikutuksia estimoidaan paljon käytetyillä 
vektoriautoregressiivisillä malleilla. Keskeinen piirre näiden VAR-mallien sovel-
tamisen kannalta rahapolitiikan vaikutusten arviointiin liittyy rahapolitiikan todel-
listen ei-päätösperäisten, yllättävien muutosten identifiointiin. Korrektin identi-
fioinnin varmistamiseksi rahapolitiikan ohjauskorkoon kohdistuvat sokit erotetaan 
tässä tutkimuksessa Yhdysvaltain keskuspankin ajan mittaan vaihtelevaan 
inflaatiotavoitteeseen  kohdistuvista sokeista. Vaikka tilastohavainnot tukevat 
kustannuskanavan olemassaoloa, rahapolitiikan kiristymistä seuraa estimoidussa 
mallissa inflaatiovauhdin hidastuminen. Estimoitu malli ei siis selitä hinta-
pähkinää ja se on tältä osin ristiriidassa VAR-malleihin perustuvan empiirisen 
näytön kanssa. Työssä pohditaan mahdollisia syistä tähän ristiriitaan. 
 
Avainsanat: kustannuskanava, inflaatiodynamiikka, hintapähkinä, inflaatiotavoite 
 
JEL-luokittelu: E30, E52  
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What is the short-run reaction of inﬂa t i o nt oa nu n e x p e c t e da n dt e m p o r a r y
monetary policy tightening? Macroeconomic textbooks suggest that inﬂation
should react negatively to such a monetary policy move (Woodford, 2003a;
Galì, 2008). However, empirical investigations based on the VAR-methodology
cast doubts on this prediction.
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response functions produced with a VAR
estimated with post-WWII US data.1 An unexpected one-shot increase in
the policy rate leads to i) a signiﬁcantly positive reaction of the policy rate, ii)
as i g n i ﬁcantly negative reaction of the business cycle, and iii) a signiﬁcantly
positive reaction of inﬂation. This evidence stands in stark contrast with
conventional wisdom. Eichenbaum (1992) labeled this short-run positive
conditional correlation between policy rate and inﬂation the ‘price puzzle’ (the
‘VAR evidence’ henceforth). Importantly, Castelnuovo and Surico (2009) show
that this result is robust to the implementation of an alternative identiﬁcation
strategy, based on sign restriction, which does not assume recursiveness, and
it is then consistent with the timing of models such as the popular standard
new-Keynesian framework.
In fact, a possible interpretation of this VAR empirical regularity is oﬀered
by models embedding the ‘supply channel’, otherwise known as the ’cost
channel’. The idea is simple. Cash-constrained ﬁrms must borrow money
from ﬁnancial intermediaries to pay the wage-bills to workers before the goods
market opens. Consequently, the interest rate paid on borrowings enters ﬁrms’
marginal costs and inﬂuences ﬁrms’ price setting, so giving a structural role
to the presence of the policy rate in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. This
creates an extra-link between monetary policy moves and aggregate inﬂation
ﬂuctuations (Ravenna and Walsh, 2006; Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann, and Schabert,
2006; Kilponen and Milne, 2007; Surico, 2008; Tillmann, 2009; and Llosa
and Tuesta, 2009). Clearly, if the inﬂationary impact induced by monetary
policy moves via the supply channel is stronger than the one operating via
the standard ‘demand channel’, a positive reaction of inﬂation to a monetary
policy tightening may very well realize.
The plausibility of such a structural interpretation, however, is ultimately
an empirical issue. This paper employes Bayesian techniques to estimate a
new-Keynesian small-scale DSGE model embedding the cost channel. The
model is an extension of the baseline, aggregate-demand based set up widely
employed to scrutinize US inﬂation (Benati and Surico, 2008a; Benati and
Surico, 2008b; Benati, 2008a; Canova, 2009). The model has the potential
to replicate the VAR evidence, because the supply channel may in principle
prevail. Our exercise aims exactly to understand if, empirically, the strength
of the cost channel is actually such to induce a positive correlation between
inﬂation and the policy rate conditional on a monetary policy shock.
1Impulse responses related to a trivariate VAR with GDP deﬂator inﬂation, CBO output
gap, and federal funds rate, sample: 1954:III—2008:II. Similar evidence, originally reported
by Sims (1992), is also put forward by Stock and Watson (2001) and Rabanal (2007). Hanson
(2004) shows that this result is robust to the introduction of commodity prices as well as a
variety of other inﬂation predictors in the VAR.
7Our main result is twofold. First, we do ﬁnd some statistical support for
the cost channel. Due to the presence of the short-term interest rate in the
inﬂation equation, the cost channel model ﬁts the data better with respect
to the standard ‘demand channel only’ new-Keynesian framework. Second,
we do reject the structural interpretation of the price puzzle. Clearly, the
data prefer a parameterization of the model for which the demand channel is
relatively stronger than the cost channel in transmitting the monetary policy
impulses to inﬂation. The estimated degree of interest rate smoothing is the
ingredient boosting the demand side’s relative strength. Possibly, this is so
because inﬂation expectations are strongly inﬂuenced by a gradual monetary
policy conduct (Woodford, 1999; Woodford, 2003b). Then, an increase in
m a r g i n a lc o s t sd r i v e nb yd r i f t si nt h ep o l i c yr a t ei sl e s si n ﬂationary than it
would be under a less persistent policy conduct. Our results are robust to a
variety of perturbations of the baseline analysis — sample selection, diﬀerent
measure of inﬂation, diﬀe r e n tm o d e l sf o rt h ep o l i c ys h o c k .W et h e nc o n c l u d e
that the VAR price puzzle is not a fact, but instead an artifact possibly due
to model misspeciﬁcation.
B e f o r em o v i n gt ot h en e x tS e c t i o n ,w em a k ec o n t a c t sw i t hs o m es t r i c t l y
related contributions. Barth and Ramey (2001) analyze diﬀerent US sectors
and ﬁnd that sectorial diﬀerences in the working capital may rationalize the
heterogeneous impact across sectors of a monetary policy shock. Similar
results are obtained by Gaiotti and Secchi (2006) for Italy, and Dedola and
Lippi (2005) for France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. In a
single-equation framework, Ravenna and Walsh (2006) support the presence
of the cost-channel for the US economy, Tillmann (2008) for the US, UK,
and Euro Area, and Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006) for Canada,
France, Italy, the UK and the United States. There is then support for the
empirical relevance of the cost-channel for a variety of countries, the US being
among them.
As regards the structural interpretation of the VAR evidence, Chowdhury,
Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006) couple an estimated Phillips curve embedding
the cost channel with a calibrated demand side, and show that such model
replicate the VAR evidence as for Italy, the UK, and the United States.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) estimate a model featuring several
nominal and real rigidities by indirect inference (impulse response matching),
and also replicate such a fact. With the same econometric strategy, Henzel,
Hulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershaeuser (2007) obtain similar results for
t h eE u r oA r e a . W h i l eo ﬀering stimulating results, this evidence is not
conclusive. Calibrated models may lead to dynamics that are at odds with the
data. Moreover, estimation techniques such as impulse-response matching are
bias-prone, and may lead to fragile conclusions when confronted to alternatives
such as Bayesian estimation (see Canova and Sala, 2009).
The paper closest to ours is probably Rabanal (2007). He investigates the
sign and magnitude of the inﬂation reaction to a monetary policy shock by
estimating a medium-scale model a la Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) with Bayesian techniques, and ﬁnds evidence supporting the ‘textbook’
monetary policy transmission mechanism. In his paper, the key-drivers for this
result are i) a less than full wage indexation, ii) a moderate wage stickiness,
8and iii) a high price stickiness. Our paper diﬀers from Rabanal’s (2007) along
several dimension. First, we jointly model the standard monetary policy shock
and the shock to ’trend inﬂation’, ie the time-varying inﬂation target set by
the Fed. This is a key-modeling choice. In fact, if the Fed had actually pursued
a time-varying inﬂation target, in assuming a constant target we would force
t h ed y n a m i c so ft h ei n ﬂation target to enter the ‘residual’ of the policy rule,
and we would label as ‘policy shock’ what, de facto,i sac o n v o l u t i o no ft h e
true policy innovation and the inﬂation target dynamics. Bache and Leitemo
(2008) show that this misspeciﬁcation can dramatically bias impulse responses
to a monetary policy shock in autoregressive models. Given the empirical
evidence pointing towards trend inﬂation in the US (Ireland, 2007; Cogley
and Sbordone, 2008; Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent, 2009, we believe that
the separate identiﬁcation of these two monetary policy shocks is important
for the issue at stake). Second, we relax the unitary upper bound to the cost
channel parameter imposed by Rabanal (2007) when conducting his estimates.
While such an upper bound represents a natural imposition when interpreting
the cost channel parameter as the share of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms in the
economy, frictions on the ﬁnancial markets may indeed suggest a pass-through
from the policy rate to the lending rate larger than one (Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann,
and Schabert, 2006; Tillmann, 2008). Moreover, model misspeciﬁcation — eg
a too simplistic banking sector — may easily turn the structural cost channel
parameter to a reduced form capturing the direct eﬀect of the policy rate to
inﬂation. At that point, however, the imposition of a unitary upper bound
would not necessarily be warranted. For these reasons, we allow the cost
channel parameter to take values above one, so possibly putting the model in a
more favorable condition to replicate the VAR fact. All in all, our contribution
should be seen as complementary with respect to Rabanal’s (2007).
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 presents the new-Keynesian model
with the cost channel we work with, and scrutinizes the role that the model’s
parameters plays in shaping the inﬂation reaction to a monetary policy shock.
Section 3 presents and discusses our empirical ﬁndings. In Section 4 we show
that our baseline results are robust to a variety of perturbations — sample
selection, diﬀerent inﬂation measures, diﬀerent structure of the policy shock.
A discussion on the reasons underlying the possible misspeciﬁcation of the
policy shock in VAR analysis is then oﬀered in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
92 A model with the cost channel
As discussed above, we concentrate on a new-Keynesian DSGE model ﬂexible
enough to replicate the VAR evidence.
2.1 Structure of the model














































Eq. (2.1) is an expectational new-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in which
πt stands for the inﬂation rate, β identiﬁes the discount factor, α indicates
price indexation to past-inﬂation, xt identiﬁes the business cycle — the ‘output
gap’ — whose impact on current inﬂation is inﬂuenced by the slope-parameter
κ (a convolution of the discount factor and the probability of non-reoptimizing
prices by ﬁrms), σ is the representative consumers’ degree of relative risk
aversion, η is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, and επ
t is interpreted as
‘inﬂation’ shock, or ‘supply’ shifter. Diﬀerently with respect to the ‘demand
channel only’ models, eq. (2.1) embeds a direct impact of the nominal interest
rate Rt on the inﬂation rate, which is active as long as the ‘cost channel’
parameter ψ>0.
Eq. (2.2) is obtained by log-linearizing the consumption Euler equation
stemming from the household’s intertemporal problem. Output ﬂuctuations
are driven both by expectations on future realizations of the business cycle and
by the ex-ante real interest rate, whose loading (the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, ie IES) is a convolution of habits and relative risk aversion.
The demand shock vx
t , which is autoregressive as suggested by eq. (2.5), is
interpreted as households’ preference shock or a ﬁscal shock.3 Eq. (2.3) is a
Taylor rule postulating the systematic reaction of the policy rate to movements
2The variables in the model are expressed in log-deviations with respect to their
non-stochastic steady state values or, as for ouptut, in deviations with respect to its long-run
trend.
3In a former version of the paper we modeled also the inﬂationary shock as an
autoregressive process of order one. Possibly, this is due to the presence in the NKPC
of the policy rate, which inherits (part of the) persistence of the trend inﬂation process.
We eventually decided against it because we veriﬁed that i) the estimated persistence of
such shock in this application is very low, and ii) its contribution to the ﬁto ft h em o d e li s
negligible.
10in the inﬂation gap and the output gap. Past policy decisions matter, and their
impact is captured by the interest rate smoothing parameter φR,a si nC l a r i d a ,
Galì, and Gertler (2000). The zero-mean i.i.d. random shock εR
t stands for the
monetary policy innovation. The evolution of the inﬂation target — formalized
by eq. (2.4) — is dictated by the autoregressive parameter ρ∗ as well as the
volatility σ∗ of its innovation ε∗
t. This process is typically assumed to be a
random walk or a very-persistent variance-stationary process capturing the
low-frequency component of the inﬂation rate, which are likely to be sensible
approximations of the time-varying target set by monetary-policy authorities.
The innovation processes (2.6) close the model.
A set up similar to the one hereby presented (time-varying inﬂation target
aside) has recently been object of theoretical investigations by Ravenna and
Walsh (2006), Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006), Kilponen and
Milne (2007), Surico (2008), Tillmann (2009), and Llosa and Tuesta (2009).
2.2 Investigating the mechanism
Before moving to estimation, it is of interest to perform some simulations in
order to scrutinize the ability of the model to match the VAR evidence, ie to
replicate the price puzzle. Given the timing of the model, very standard in the
new-Keynesian arena, inﬂation may immediately (contemporaneously) jump
up in reaction to a policy tightening. This upward jump, which is at odds with
conventional wisdom, would i) prove the model to be able to replicate the VAR
fact, ii) corroborate the structural interpretation of such fact, and iii) points
towards the cost channel as the ingredient possibly needed to replicate it.
We perform the following exercise. First, we calibrate the model with
sensible parameter values — we employ β =0 .99,ψ =1 .75,κ =0 .05,α =
0.5,σ =3 ,η =1 ,h =0 .7,φ π =1 .7,φ x =0 .3,φ R =0 .3.4 We then explore
the robustness of the conclusions coming from the baseline calibration by
perturbing the parameters one-by-one. To have a sense of the diﬀerent impact
that those perturbations may have on the inﬂation dynamics, we repeat the
same exercise also for the ‘demand channel only’ model — ie under ψ =0 .5 For
comparability reasons, we normalize the monetary policy shock so to induce
an on-impact 25 basis points jump of the policy rate.
Figure 2 displays the model consistent on-impact inﬂation reactions. First
of all, the model is clearly able to produce a positive inﬂation reaction
to an unexpected interest rate hike, which is indeed the outcome of the
baseline calibration (identiﬁed by vertical black dotted lines). Second, the
4To simulate the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock assumed to be uncorrelated to all
other shocks, we set all other shocks’ standard deviations to zero. Consequently, we need
not specify the values for the roots of the AR(1) exogenous processes of our model.
5We solve the model numerically by searching for the unique equilibrium under rational
expectations. For a discussion of the uniqueness conditions in the model (1)—(3) with
no endogenous persistence of any sort and with a central bank just reacting to inﬂation
ﬂuctuations, see Brueckner and Schabert (2003). Regarding this issue, Surico (2008)
investigates the role played by the systematic reaction to output gap ﬂuctuations. Llosa
and Tuesta (2009) study the eﬀects of the cost-channel on determinacy and learnability of
the rational expectations equilibrium.
11qualitative impact of perturbations to the model parameters is mostly in
line with expectations. Obviously, a higher cost channel renders more likely
to get the inﬂationary eﬀect out of a policy tightening. The same holds
true as for habit formation, which decreases IES. The (inverse of the) labor
elasticity η works instead in favor of the demand channel: The higher η,
the lower the labor supply elasticity to real wage ﬂuctuations (ie the higher
the slope of the labor supply), the higher the real wage and marginal cost
drop after a policy shock, the more intense the negative push on inﬂation
exerted by the demand channel. The slope of the NKPC and the relative
risk aversion parameter’s impacts are a priori unclear. On the one hand, they
enhance the deﬂationary demand pressure due to an economic bust triggered
by a conservative monetary policy shock. One the other, the relative risk
aversion has a negative impact on the IES, and both κ and σ enhance also
the cost channel eﬀect (see the NKPC (2.1)). It turns out that, under the
baseline calibration, both parameters increase the likelihood of the inﬂationary
eﬀect. Interestingly, the weakening of the demand channel by σ is present
also when the ‘demand channel only’ framework is considered (green dotted
line). Obviously, the opposite holds as for the slope of the NKPC, which,
absent the supply channel, clearly magniﬁes the deﬂationary impact of a
policy tightening. Price indexation monotonically increases the probability
of a positive policy rate-inﬂation conditional correlation, possibly because of
the persistence induced in the inﬂation process that is translated into higher
inﬂation expectations. The Taylor rule parameters on the inﬂation gap also
strengthen the policy inﬂationary eﬀect: Given that the baseline calibration
suggests ‘inﬂation up’, the higher the policy rate reaction to inﬂation, the
stronger the supply channel. The reaction to the output gap seems to be
hardly inﬂuent in this simulation. By contrast, and not surprisingly, the
interest rate smoothing parameter clearly boosts the demand side’s relative
strength. This is so because inﬂation expectations are strongly inﬂuenced by
the monetary policy conduct given the latter’s persistence (Woodford, 1999;
Woodford, 2003b), then an increase in marginal costs driven by borrowing
costs is less inﬂationary than it would be under a less gradual policy conduct.
Finally, when switching oﬀ the cost-channel, we are obviously left with negative
inﬂation realizations no matter what the calibration employed is.
Wrapping up, diﬀerent calibrations may lead to diﬀerent on-impact
reactions. We then move to the estimation of the structural model to let
the data free to speak as regards magnitude and sign of the inﬂation reaction
to a monetary policy shock.
3 Bayesian estimation
We estimate the model (2.1)—(2.6) with Bayesian methods (for an extensive
survey, see An and Schorfheide, 2007) for the sample 1954:III—2008:II. We limit
our study to the second quarter of 2008 so to avoid dealing with the acceleration
of the ﬁnancial crises began with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, which triggered non-standard policy moves by the Fed
12(Brunnermeier, 2009). Importantly, the use of a full system approach is likely
to limit the weak instruments problem aﬀecting GMM when applied to hybrid
schedules displaying rational expectations among the drivers of the modeled
variables (Mavroeidis, 2004 and Canova and Sala, 2009). Moreover, the full
system estimation enables us to account for cross equation restrictions clearly
aﬀecting the estimation of NKPC’s parameters (for a maximum likelihood
application to the Euro-area NKPC, see Fanelli, 2008). In the model we focus
on, a notable example regards the time-varying inﬂation target, which enters
(also) the solution of the inﬂation rate and shapes its persistence, so clearly
aﬀecting the estimate of the cost channel parameter as well as others (eg price
indexation).
To estimate the model, we employ three observables. The output gap is
computed as percentualized log-deviation of the real GDP with respect to
the potential output as computed by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce.6 The
inﬂa t i o nr a t ei st h eq u a r t e r l yg r o w t hr a t eo ft h eG D Pd e ﬂator. Finally, for the
short-term nominal interest rate we consider the eﬀective federal funds rate
(averages of monthly values) expressed in quarterly terms. The source of the
data is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FREDII). All the transformed
data are demeaned before estimation.
3.1 Priors
Our Bayesian estimation calls for the imposition of prior densities on the model
parameters. First and foremost, we have to set a prior for the cost channel
parameter ψ. Exploring US data with Bayesian techniques, Rabanal (2007)
estimates it to be 0.15 in a full sample analysis, and 0.56 for the 1980s and
1990s. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) appeal to single-equation GMM estimation
and ﬁnd it to be 1.276 (benchmark estimate of the battery they provide), a
v a l u ev e r yc l o s et ot h a tp u tf o r w a r db yC h o w d h u r ye ta l( 2 0 0 6 ) ,w h op r o p o s e
1.3 on the basis of GMM estimation. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) set it to 1. In order not to play against the cost channel interpretation
of the inﬂation reaction found with VARs, we assume ψ to be Normally
distributed with mean 1.75 (that is the value we employed in investigating
the mechanism, see Section 2.2). However, to remain relatively agnostic on
this parameter, we allow for a fairly large standard deviation, ie 0.7. We also
impose dogmatic priors as for the inverse of the labor supply elasticity η and
the slope of the NKPC. As for the former parameter, since we do not employ
labor data in the estimation, and given the identiﬁcation issues regarding it, we
6Ravenna and Walsh (2006) point out that under an active cost-channel, the welfare
relevant output gap is the one computed by considering ﬂexible output conditional on
a constant and positive nominal interest rate. Interestingly, Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008a) show that the correlation between the theoretical output gap — computed with
a medium-scale DSGE model — and empirical measures of the output gap like the one
employed in this paper is high. Moreover, the model we focus on does not display capital,
then the model-consistent natural level of output could very well be misspeciﬁed. Finally,
we ran some exercised in which we switched oﬀ the reaction of the Fed to business cycle
ﬂuctuations. The results presented in this paper are robust to this perturbation of the
model.
13calibrated it to 1, a standard value in the literature. Preliminary attempts to
estimate the slope of the NKPC led to implausibly low realizations, a problem
encountered by eg Ireland (2004). We then set κ to 0.05, a value in line with
recent empirical evidence (Benati and Surico, 2008a and 2008b). As for the
trend inﬂation process, we follow Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009) and set
the autoregressive parameter ρ∗ to 0.995 so to force the trend inﬂation process
to capture low-frequency movements in inﬂation. Following the convention,
we also ﬁx the discount factor β =0 .99 (corresponding to an annual discount
rate of approximately 4%). Given the relevance of the interest rate smoothing
degree φR — shown in Section 2.2 — we assume a beta distribution with a
conservative prior mean — 0.5 — and a large standard deviation — 0.285.T h e
remaining priors are standard, and in line with Benati and Surico (2008a) and
Benati and Surico (2008b) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009) as for
the parameters in common. Table 1 collects our prior densities.
3.2 Posterior densities and Bayesian impulse responses
Given the vector ξ =( ψ,β,α,κ,η,σ,h,φπ,φ x,φ R,ρ x,ρ ∗,σ π,σx,σR,σ∗)0 of
structural parameters, the vector of endogenous variables zt =[ xt,πt,R t]0,
the autoregressive demand shock εt =[ vx





t]0, and the vector of observable variables we aim at tracking
Yt =[ xt,πt,R t]0, we write the model in state space form, we relate the latent
processes to the observable variables via the measurement equation (without
assuming any measurement errors),7 and we employ the Kalman ﬁlter to
evaluate the likelihood L({Yt}
T
t=1 | ξ). The posterior distribution p(ξ |{ Yt}
T
t=1)
is then proportional to the product of the likelihood function L({Yt}
T
t=1 | ξ)
and the priors Π(ξ).8
7Estimations obtained by adding white noise measurement errors — not shown for the
sake of brevity, but available upon request — conﬁrmed the robustness of our ﬁndings.
8To perform our Bayesian estimation we employed Dynare 4.0, available at
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/. The model is estimated by implementing a two-step
strategy. First, we estimate the mode of the posterior distribution by maximizing the
log-posterior density, which combines our priors on the parameters of interest with the
likelihood function. Second, we employ the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
estimate the posterior distribution. The mode of each parameter’s posterior distribution
was computed by using the ‘csminwel’ algorithm elaborated by Chris Sims. A check of the
posterior mode, performed by plotting the posterior density for values around the computed
mode for each estimated parameter in turn, conﬁrmed the goodness of our optimizations. We
then exploited such modes for initializing the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
simulate the posterior distributions. In particular, the inverse of the Hessian of the posterior
distribution evaluated at the posterior mode was used to deﬁne the variance-covariance
matrix of the chain. The initial VCV matrix of the forecast errors in the Kalman ﬁlter is
set to be equal to the unconditional variance of the state variables. We initialized the state
vector in the Kalman ﬁlter with steady-state values. We simulated two chains of 500,000
draws each, and discarded the ﬁrst 50% as burn-in. To scale the variance-covariance matrix
of the random walk chain we used factors implying an acceptance rate belonging to the
[23%, 40%] interval. We veriﬁed the convergence towards the target posterior distribution
via the Brooks and Gelman (1998) convergence checks. As typically done in the literature,
we discarded all the draws not implying a unique equilibrium of the system.
14Our posterior estimates are reported in Table 1. First, we focus on the
cost channel parameter ψ. Its posterior mean reads 1.18, clearly smaller
than the prior mean — the latter being 1.75. Still, it is ‘signiﬁcant’, ie the
5th percentile of its posterior density reads 0.60, a value clearly larger than
zero. Notably, this result does not appear to be driven by our prior choice.
When re-estimating the model either with the prior ψ ∼ N(1,0.7) —s ow i t h
am a r k e dd o w n w a r ds h i f to ft h em e a n—o rw i t hψ ∼ N(1,1.3) —w i t ham u c h
larger variance — we obtained densities comparable to those displayed in Table
1. Interestingly, when shutting down the cost channel and re-estimating the
model, the marginal likelihood deteriorates of about 2 log-points,9 ie the Bayes
factor amounts to exp(2) ≈ 7.4. This deterioration oﬀers ‘positive’ evidence
in favor of the cost channel model.10 The posterior mean is close to the
point estimates put forward by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury,
Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006), and it is somewhat larger than the one by
Rabanal (2007).
The remaining estimated parameters assume values in line with previous
contributions (eg Rabanal, 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008a). In particular, the NKPC turns out to be purely-forward
looking, a ﬁnding recently discussed, among others, by Benati (2009), Cogley
and Sbordone (2008) in a NKPC in which trend inﬂation appears as a further
driver.11 Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2009) perform GMM estimation with
identiﬁcation-robust methods of the semi-structural version of the NKPC we
focus on (cost channel aside), and cannot reject the null of purely forward
looking inﬂation process. The demand shock is fairly persistent, but the
estimated autoregressive parameter value is far from unity. This suggests
that in the model there is a propagation mechanism of the shocks capable to
replicate the unit-root like dynamics of output without the need of imposing
a unit-root (or almost unit-root) IS disturbance.
Figure 3 — top panel contrasts actual series with the model’s one-step-ahead
predictions. Indeed, the model is successful in predicting our observables.
Figure 3 — bottom panel contrasts actual inﬂation to the estimated
time-varying inﬂation target set by the Fed in the post-WWII. The pattern
followed by the estimated target is quite sensible, and clearly falls in the
credible set estimated by Cogley and Sbordone (2008). We take the evidence
proposed in Figure 3 as supporting the empirical ability of our framework to
ﬁt the post-WWII US data.
9We computed the log-marginal likelihoods both by means of the Laplace approximation
around the posterior mode (based on a normal distribution) and via the modiﬁed harmonic
mean estimator (Geweke, 1998), which exploits the draws from the posterior distribution.
The two methods deliver virtually identical results. This is due to the close-to-normal
distribution of all the estimated posteriors. Given the large computational gains implied by
the Laplace approximation, we employ this approximation for our model comparison.
10According to Kass and Raftery (1995), a Bayes factor between 1 and 3 is ‘not worth
more than a bare mention’, between 3 and 20 suggests a ‘positive’ evidence in favor of one
of the two models, between 20 and 150 suggests a ‘strong’ evidence against it, and larger
than 150 ‘very strong’ evidence.
11Technically, Benati (2009) and Cogley and Sbordone (2008) consider NKPC curves
log-linearized around a positive value for the inﬂation rate in steady-state, ie ‘trend inﬂation’
as popularized by Ascari (2004). Diﬀerently, we consider a model consistent with a zero
inﬂation rate in steady-state.
15Ultimately, however, this analysis aims at pinning down the reaction of
inﬂation to a monetary policy shock. Figure 4 — top panel shows the estimated
dynamics responses to such a shock. The data speak clearly. The presence of an
active cost channel is far from overturning conventional wisdom: A monetary
policy tightening opens a recession, and such downward demand pressure leads
to a statistically signiﬁcant deﬂationary phase. The output gap then follows
an hump-shaped convergence pattern towards the steady state. The policy
rate and the inﬂation rate also gradually go back to their steady states.
While being statistically signiﬁcant, the economic role of the cost channel
appears to be present but limited. Figure 5 displays the impulse response
of the benchmark model to the four estimated shocks, and contrasts them
with those estimated in the ‘no cost channel’ scenario. Indeed, diﬀerences
appear to be marginal, with the exception of the reaction of the output gap
to a trend inﬂation shock, which is clearly milder when the cost channel is
considered, possibly due to more moderate interest rate deviations from the
steady state. These responses suggest that the relevance of the cost channel
might be conditional to the type of shock a researcher is interested into.
3.3 Interpreting the result: The role of interest rate smoothing
We have established that, at an empirical level, the demand channel
overwhelms the cost channel in translating the impact of the policy rate hike
on inﬂation. Why is it so? A scrutiny of the estimated parameters of the
model and their impact on inﬂa t i o nr e a c t i o ng u i d e du st ot h erole of interest
rate smoothing. Getting back to Figure 1, one may indeed notice that the
sensitivity of the sign of the inﬂation reaction under a plausible calibration is
mainly driven, in terms of magnitude, by such parameter. Possibly, this is so
because inﬂation expectations are strongly inﬂuenced by the monetary policy
conduct given the latter’s persistence (Woodford, 1999; Woodford, 2003b),
then an increase in marginal costs driven by borrowing costs is less inﬂationary
than it would be under a less ﬁrm policy conduct. Indeed, when re-estimating
the model by setting φR =0 , one may observe a substantially weakened
estimated eﬀect of monetary policy on inﬂation, as shown by Figure 6. Still,
an interest rate hike is deﬂationary (conﬁdence bands, not shown, conﬁrm
that it is statistically so). This is due to the fact that we re-estimated the
entire model under φR =0 , so allowing all the other parameters to adjust
to ﬁt the data at best. In particular, the cost channel, habit formation, and
Taylor rule parameters all adjust downwards, so partly ‘counter-balancing’
the inﬂationary eﬀect of the missing interest rate smoothing (results available
upon request). However, the marginal likelihood of the model with no interest
rate smoothing clearly works against it, reading −680.15, ie a deterioration of
about 257 log-points. Conditionally to the model at hand, the data clearly
suggest a rejection of the structural interpretation of the price puzzle.
164 Robustness checks
We check the robustness of our ﬁndings along three dimensions:
• Subsample stability. The analysis developed so far has relied on the
assumption of stability of the structural parameters in the sample at
hand, as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008a). However, the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the
Fed has been associated to a break in the US monetary policy conduct
(Clarida, Galì, and Gertler, 2000; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004; Boivin
and Giannoni, 2006; Benati and Surico, 2008b; and Mavroeidis, 2009).
To control for these break, we re-estimate the model by focusing on
the subsamples 1954:III—1979:II and 1982:IV—2008:II. We do not include
the span 1979:III—1982:III not to deal with the ‘Volcker experiment’, ie
the period during which Chairman Paul Volcker targeted non-borrowed
reserves, a monetary policy hard to describe with a Taylor rule.
Our results are displayed in Table 1 (2nd and 3rd column) and Figure
3 (2nd and 3rd row). The two main messages are robust to this
subsample analysis: i) There is an active cost channel, whose importance
is supported by the marginal likelihood comparison in the second
subsample. In fact, the ﬁrst one is less supportive, but it is still hard
to clearly reject its importance; ii) the eﬀect of a monetary policy
tightening is clearly deﬂationary. As regards the remaining parameters,
one may notice that the systematic reaction to inﬂation gap ﬂuctuations
is larger in the second subsample, a ﬁnding in line with several recent
studies (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent, 2009; Benati and Surico, 2008b; and Mavroeidis,
2009). In the ﬁrst subsample, such estimated reaction is larger than what
typically found in the literature. This is due to the fact that we truncate
the parameter space and concentrate on the ‘determinacy territory’.12
M o r e o v e r ,i nt h i sm o d e lt h eo b j e c tt a r g e t e db yt h eF e di st h ei n ﬂation
gap, as opposed to the raw inﬂation rate typically considered in Taylor
rule estimations — notable exceptions being Castelnuovo, Greco and
Raggi (2008) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009). The estimated
shocks’ standard deviations are clearly smaller in the ‘Great Moderation’
subsample, a ﬁnding already put forward by Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008b). The remaining parameters, cost channel parameter included,
display stability over subsamples, with the exception of habit formation,
12Clarida, Galì, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni
(2006), and Mavroeidis (2009) oﬀer support to the ‘indeterminacy’ hypothesis to explain
the US macroeconomic dynamics in the 1970s. Castelnuovo and Surico (2009) show that
indeterminacy may oﬀer a rationale for the price puzzle typically found when estimating
the eﬀects of a monetary policy shocks with VAR models. Surico (2006) discusses the perils
coming from merging two subsamples featuring diﬀerent equilibria. However, Sims and Zha
(2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008b) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2009) cast
doubs on multiple equilibria as a relevant feature to describe the dynamics of the 1960s
and 1970s. Moreover, Castelnuovo (2009) shows that the equilibrium selection strategy one
implements under indeterminacy may importantly drive the model consistent theoretical
volatilities. We then decided to stick to the uniqueness scenario.
17which increases.
• Alternative inﬂation measures. In our benchmark exercise we consider
the GDP deﬂator inﬂation as relevant measure of inﬂation. However,
alternative measures of inﬂation may be considered. We then repeat
our exercise either with the growth rate of Personal Consumption
Expenditure (PCE) or Consumer Price Index (CPI) (less food and
energy). Figure 7 contrasts the benchmark analysis with alternatives.
Some remarks are in order. The alternative measures of inﬂation suggest
a weaker impact of the real ex-ante interest rate on aggregate demand
and, consequently, a less deﬂationary eﬀect. This is in part due to the
rightward shift of the cost channel parameter’s posterior densities, whose
mean is 1.36 and [5th, 95th] percentiles are [0.82,1.96] in the case of PCE
inﬂation, and 1.83 − [1.14,2.48] in that of CPI inﬂation. Interestingly,
the model with cost channel is favored by the data also when these
alternative inﬂation indicators are employed. In particular, the marginal
likelihood suggests a diﬀerence of (−413.59)−(−417.37) ≈ 3.8 log-points
when PCE inﬂation is considered, and (−420.63) − (−427.64) ≈ 7
log-points as for CPI core inﬂation. However, and most importantly
for our study, inﬂation’s reaction is still clearly negative.
• Autocorrelated monetary policy shocks. Rudebusch (2002) states that the
smooth behavior of the policy rate observed in the US (and a variety of
other countries) is not intentionally implemented by the Fed, but it is
instead caused by serially correlated monetary policy shocks. The Taylor
rule then reads as follows:












According to this policy rule monetary authorities behave in a past-dependent
fashion also under φR =0 . This is so because the shock εR
t is a state variable
of the system. We assume the prior density ρε ∼ β(0.5,0.285).F i g u r e 7
shows also the estimated reactions under this alternative speciﬁcation of the
policy rule. The presence of an autoregressive monetary policy shock reinforces
the impact of the monetary policy move by inducing a more severe recession
and a larger deﬂation. In terms of model ﬁt, we notice that the model with
autoregressive policy shocks’s marginal likelihood reads −419.80, and it is then
to be preferred to the ’interest rate smoothing only’ framework — the marginal
likelihood diﬀerence, in terms of log-points, is about 4. However, this result
does not oﬀer support to Rudebusch’s (2002) ‘interest rate smoothing illusion’
argument. In fact, the marginal likelihood of a model estimated under φR =
0,ρ ε > 0 reads −506.60, a dramatic deterioration of the model ﬁt — around 83
log-points. This ﬁnding corroborates previous research by English, Nelson, and
Sack (2003) and Castelnuovo (2003), who support the hypothesis of gradualism
intentionally pursued by the Fed in the post-WWII sample.
185V A R m i s s p e c i ﬁcation and the price puzzle
Our exercise leads to a rebuttal of the structural interpretation of the VAR
evidence. Rabanal (2007) reaches the same conclusion by focusing on the
importance of diﬀerent sources of persistence in the Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) model. Then, if estimated models do not oﬀer a rationale
for the price puzzle, why do we observe it in VARs?
Sims (1992) was the ﬁr s tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h ep r i c ep u z z l ei sl i k e l yt ob e
due to a misspeciﬁcation of the monetary policy shock. In fact, if the central
bank reacts to expected inﬂation, then a predicted upcoming surge in inﬂation
will be followed by an increase in the policy rate, a decrease in the output
gap, and — as long as the monetary policy tightening is not such to fully oﬀset
the inﬂationary shock — a rise in current inﬂation. If the VAR omits expected
inﬂation, and if expected inﬂation and current inﬂation are not strictly linked
(ie current inﬂation is not a ‘suﬃcient statistic’ for expected inﬂation), then the
supposed-to-be monetary policy shock in a trivariate VAR in inﬂation, output
gap, and policy rate will somewhat naturally capture the positive correlation
between inﬂation and the policy rate, ie it will produce a price puzzle. Sims
(1992) proposed to add an indicator of nascent inﬂation (commodity prices) to
the vector of variables of interest. While not solving the price puzzle problem,
this trick clearly renders the picture less puzzling.
T h eo m i t t e dv a r i a b l ei s s u ei sa l s ot a c k l e db yB e r n a n k e ,B o i v i n ,a n dE l i a s z
(2005) and Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2009), who show that by allowing
some factors extracted by a large panel of variables to enter the vector
autoregression (as ‘endogenous variables’) the price puzzle tends to disappear.
Forni and Gambetti (2008) focus on an open economy VAR and show that both
the price puzzle and the forward discount puzzle — which refers to the small
scale VAR evidence of a ‘delayed overshooting’ — disappear when a data-rich
approach in the context of a structural factor model is considered. Castelnuovo
a n dS u r i c o( 2 0 0 9 )s h o wt h a tt h ep r i c ep u z z l ee v i d e n c ei sa c t u a l l yl i m i t e dt o
the pre-Volcker subsample — similar evidence is provided by Barth and Ramey
(2001), Hanson (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006). Working with a model
in which they simulate a policy shift resembling the one estimated for the US
case, Castelnuovo and Surico (2009) show that a standard trivariate VAR
estimated on pseudo-data may indeed produce a price puzzle when, in fact,
the model generating such pseudo-data suggests a negative inﬂation reaction
to a policy tightening. They show that this is possibly due to the omission in
the VAR of inﬂation expectations under the weak monetary policy scenario.
Interestingly, some of the best predictors of future inﬂation turn out to
be useless for correcting the bias in the dynamics of inﬂation, as shown
by Hanson (2004). Other recent contributions have pointed towards other
types of VAR misspeciﬁcations. Leeper and Roush (2003) show that money
is important for well specifying the monetary policy shock when studying
economies in which a double-causal link between money and interest rate might
have occurred. In particular, if the central bank reacts contemporaneously
to monetary aggregates, and if money demand is contemporaneously driven
by the nominal interest rate, then the omission of money would lead to a
misspeciﬁcation of the monetary policy shock. A diﬀerent issue is raised by
19Giordani (2004), who shows that the omission of potential output in standard
trivariate VARs may severely bias impulse responses and be the responsible
of the price puzzle. In fact, potential output appears in all the equations
of a standard new-Keynesian AD/AS model. Hence, its omission will lead
supposed-to-be shocks to be residuals correlated across the VAR equations,
and consequently to produce biased impulse response functions. Romer and
Romer (2004) stick on a standard trivariate VAR but produce a careful measure
of the monetary policy shocks based on changes in the intended federal funds
rate and the Fed’s expectations on future inﬂation and output. Such new
measure of monetary policy shock does not imply any price puzzle in their
estimated VARs.
While presenting somewhat diﬀerent views on how to model a monetary
policy shock in a VAR framework, these papers clearly express a common
vieon the ‘price puzzle’, ie they qualify it as an ‘artifact’ due to model
misspeciﬁcation, more than a genuine ‘fact’.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper showed that a new-Keynesian model embedding the cost channel
m a yh a r d l yo ﬀer a rationale for the price puzzle typically found when
conducting VAR analysis. Under some particular parameterizations of the
model, a positive inﬂation reaction to an unexpected, restrictive monetary
policy may actually arise. However, when taking the model to the data, the
structural interpretation of the VAR evidence is clearly rebutted. The impact
exerted by the estimated systematic monetary policy gradualism is shown to
possibly drive this result. Our ﬁndings are robust to several perturbations to
the baseline analysis, including diﬀerent sample selection, alternative inﬂation
indicators, and a diﬀerent statistical model for the monetary policy shock. We
think of this result as being important for understanding the sign (and the
magnitude) that monetary policy actions should take in response to shocks
moving inﬂation oﬀ target.
We stress that this paper does oﬀer some evidence in favor of the cost
channel. In particular, the presence of such channel seems to be economically
important when assessing the reaction of output to a trend inﬂation shock.
In general, the structural role of the interest rate in the Phillips curve calls
for a serious re-thinking of optimal monetary policy in presence of supply
eﬀects. Contributions along this path have recently been proposed by Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) and Kilponen and Milne (2007). Moreover, given the
uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of the cost channel parameter, more
research is needed both for the quantiﬁcation of the importance of the cost
channel and for the design of an optimal monetary policy in presence of cost
channel uncertainty, an issue recently tackled by Tillmann (2009). Llosa and
Tuesta (2009) analyze the relationship between uniqueness and learnability
of equilibrium in presence of supply eﬀects, a topic of great relevance for
policymakers. We plan to participate to this exciting agenda with further
investigations in the close future.
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Log(ML) −− 423.64 −229.62 −79.84
Log(ML|ψ=0) −− 425.59 −227.78 −96.11
Table 1: Bayesian estimates of the benchmark model. Full sample
and subsample posterior densities. Prior densities: Figures indicate the
(mean,st.dev.) of each prior distribution. Posterior densities: Figures reported
indicate the posterior mean and the [5th, 95th] percentile of the estimated
densities. Details on the estimation procedure provided in the text. Marginal


























































Figure 1: SVAR impulse response functions to a monetary policy
shock. Sample: 1954:III—2008:II. Variables: Quarterly GDP inﬂation, CBO
output gap, quarterly federal funds rate — source: FREDII. Identiﬁcation
of the monetary policy shock via Cholesky decomposition (lower triangular
matrix, ordering: quarterly inﬂation, output gap, quarterly federal funds rate).
Solid line: Mean response. Dotted lines: 90% conﬁdence bands (analytically
computed). VAR estimated with four lags.
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Figure 2: On-impact inﬂation reaction to a monetary policy shock
under diﬀerent calibrations. Baseline calibration (indicated by vertical
black dotted lines): β =0 .99,ψ =1 .75,κ=0 .05,α =0 .5,σ =3 ,η =1 ,h=
0.7,φ π =1 .7,φ x =0 .3,φ R =0 .3, Blue solid line: Cost channel model. Green
dotted line: Model with ψ =0 . Monetary policy shock calibrated to induce a
25 basis points jump of the policy rate right after the shock (not shown).









































































Figure 3: Estimated U.S. dynamics. Top panels: Solid blue lines: Actual
series. Dotted red lines: model-based one-step-ahead forecasts (ﬁltered latent
factors). Bottom panel: Solid blue line: Actual inﬂation. Dotted magenta
line: Estimated time-varying inﬂation target (smoothed latent factor). Sample
















































































































































Figure 4: Bayesian impulse response functions to a monetary policy
shock. Solid lines: mean impulse response. Dotted lines: 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distributions. Shock size normalized so to induce
















































































































































































Figure 5: Bayesian impulse responses: Role of the cost channel.
Standard NK model: Model estimated under ψ =0 . Shocks normalized so
































































Figure 6: Bayesian impulse responses: The role of interest rate
smoothing. Shock size normalized so to induce a 25 basis point-jump of




























































AR(1) mon. pol. shock
Figure 7: Bayesian impulse responses: Alternative scenarios. Shock
size normalized so to induce a 25 basis point-jump of the quarterly policy rate.
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